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List of abbreviations and national export credit agencies 
APP   Asia Pulp & Paper
BNDES-Exim  Brazil’s export credit agency (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento   
Econômico e Social)
Coface  France’s export credit agency
CESCE  Spain’s export credit agency
ECA   Export Credit Agency
ECG    Export Credit Group (of the OECD)
ECGD  Export Credit Guarantee Department (UK’s export credit agency)
EDC   Export Development Canada
EIA   Environmental Impact Assessment
EKF   Denmark’s export credit agency
EKN   Sweden’s export credit agency
Euler Hermes Germany’s export credit agency
Finnvera  Finland’s export credit agency
IDB   Inter American Development Bank
IFC   International Finance Corporation
IMF   International Monetary Fund
JBIC    Japan Bank for International Cooperation (one of Japan’s two export credit 
agencies)
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OeKB  Oesterreichische Kontrollbank (Austria’s export credit agency)
OPIC    Overseas Private Investment Corporation (one of two US export credit 
agencies)
NEXI    Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (one of Japan’s two export credit 
agencies)
UFS   United Fiber System
US Ex-Im  US Export Import Bank (one of two US ECAs)
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Executive summary 
Exporting Destruction is the conclusion of research that included fieldwork in China, desk 
studies, and a new financial review, all commissioned to shine a light on the role that export 
credit agencies (ECAs) play in financing global deforestation. Through detailed case studies 
and historical research, FERN has been able to produce a set of policy recommendations that 
would, if implemented effectively, bring export credits in line with other publicly-funded insti-
tutions and reduce their potential for negative social and environmental impacts.
The paper suggests that while the primary, if not sole, remit of ECAs is to promote their country’s 
domestic industries in competitive and risky environments, particularly in poor emerging 
markets, the huge amounts of money involved mean that they also have an important effect 
on policies and actions in the countries in which they support projects. To put their size in 
context, ECAs underwrite around US$100 billion annually in medium and long-term credits 
and guarantees, compared with, for example, multilateral development banks, which have a 
combined total of US$60 billion in loans per year.
ECA involvement in activities that have fuelled unsustainable, and often illegal, deforestation 
in a number of countries has been documented since the mid 1990s. Evidence in this paper, 
gathered from community groups around the world, suggests that a number continue to be 
centrally involved in the sector. Their significance is primarily the result of their 'door opening' 
public finance status, as well as their focus on countries that are a high-risk for commercial 
operators, usually those which also lack the institutional governance to regulate their indus-
tries effectively.
Direct ECA support for logging or timber trading is minimal because they are not particu-
larly capital-intensive sectors, but significant support from ECAs has been instrumental in 
aiding the infrastructure and pulp and paper sectors for the last fifteen years, particularly for 
controversial expansion projects in Indonesia. FERN’s report shows that this support was, and 
continues to be, ‘blind’, not taking environmental or social issues into account or investigating 
whether operators’ prospectus documents were based on realistic assessments of the nature 
or ownership of the forest resource.
This lack of ‘ground-truth’ in assessing projects is shown to be one of the core problems of 
ECAs. Although taxpayers fund them, their remit is often limited to economic considerations, 
and they are not currently subject to the binding environmental, social, human rights or 
transparency standards by which other public sector agencies are governed. The case studies 
clearly show that this has led to increased illegal logging, corruption and the opening of previ-
ously isolated forests. Indeed, experience highlighted in the studies suggest that no ECAs have 
the relevant procedures in place to identify and address the flawed operating and expansion 
model that much of the pulp and paper sector has followed.
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What’s more, by aiming for very low-transaction costs, most ECAs have little internal capacity 
for assessing the environmental or social impacts of the operations the help to finance.
This report calls on Governments to urgently address the negative impact that ECA-supported 
operators have internationally, particularly in sensitive sectors such as forestry, and to develop 
safeguards that would ensure that the operations of export credit agencies do not serve to 
undermine international commitments to sustainable development and good governance in 
some of the poorest countries in the world. Such policies should draw on those already in place 
in most multilateral banks and some of the largest commercial ones, and be resourced and 
monitored to an extent which ensures diligent implementation. 
More specific details on what these policies should look like in the forest sector and how ECAs 
could be brought into line with two decades of their national governments commitments to 
tackle illegal logging and unsustainable deforestation can be found in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter I
A brief overview of ECAs
Export credit agencies and investment insurance agencies, commonly known as ECAs, are 
public or parastatal institutions that provide government-subsidised loans, guarantees and risk 
insurance to corporations seeking to do business in countries where the investment climate is 
judged to be too risky for conventional corporate financing. The policy rationale behind ECAs 
is to contribute to the economic well-being of the home country by boosting the domestic 
companies’ ability to win major export and construction contracts abroad. In exchange for a 
premium payment, the exporter will be reimbursed with public money in the event of default. 
Through a mechanism called ‘sovereign counter guarantee’ the exporter’s government will 
then seek to recover the loss from the government of the host country.  
Most industrialised countries and a growing number of countries with emerging market 
economies possess an ECA. In 2004, ECAs worldwide supported US$ 788 billion in trade and 
investment – some ten percent of the world’s total export trade.1 During the 1990s, financing 
directly facilitated by ECAs averaged US$80 to 100 billion per annum, approximately twice 
the world’s total overseas development assistance at the time.2 In 2004, ECA provision of 
medium and long-term insurance stood at US$76 billion – a 16 per cent increase from the 
US$66 billion in 2003.3 ECAs are a very large and important source of finance to the corporate 
world.
According to the Berne Union, the international union of credit and investment insurers, the 
trend since 2004 has been to move back towards ECAs funding large scale mining, water, infra-
structure, oil and gas projects. Investment in these had reduced since the financial crises in 
emerging markets that began in 1997.4 Without ECAs many of these large scale projects in 
countries in the South would not have gone ahead.
In addition, once companies have ECA backing, they are usually able to leverage even more 
funding.  ECA involvement tends to allow much greater access to sums from the private sector 
and often functions as the ‘door opener’ to the international capital market. So while the 
overall contribution by one or more ECAs to a given project may be small in comparison to 
other financers, the project may not have been possible without this crucial public component 
1  The Berne Union Yearbook (2006), 24. Available at: http://www.berneunion.org.uk/
2  C. Marijnissen, Export Credits: Fuelling illegal logging, FERN, 2002. Available at: www.fern.org/pubs/briefs/illegal.pdf
3  The Berne Union Yearbook (2006), p 17
4  ibid, p 25
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in the financing consortium. In other words, the importance of ECA funding goes beyond the 
amount of capital they can bring in.
In addition to direct support for projects, it has been argued that export credit guarantees can 
actually serve to undermine normal due diligence regimes by banks investing in risky projects. 
This is because ECA-backing ensures that any potential loss will be recovered by the investor 
through ‘sovereign debt arrangements’, reducing the pressure to judge the risk of default accu-
rately. Poor lending by ECAs can therefore lead to an increase in Southern countries’ debts. Up 
to one third of the debt owed by Southern countries has been linked to ECA financing. 5 
ECAs perform different tasks, and work under diverse conditions; they can be private companies 
acting on behalf of the government or government departments; they differ in their legal 
and financial status; and to some degree have varying mandates and missions. ECAs often 
compete with each other to win contracts for their domestic exporters and are thus unlikely to 
push for unilateral improvements which would put them at a tactical disadvantage. Because 
of this, recommendations made in this paper would work best if implemented at a regional or 
international level.
5  OECD: External Debt Statistics 1998-2002, ISBN 92-64-10621-9, 2004
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Chapter II
ECAs’ role in forestry investment 
This chapter provides an overview of findings from the case studies that form the backbone 
of this report. They show how ECAs provide a key source of public financing to large projects 
in many timber-producing countries currently facing governance problems including the 
enforcement of laws. Direct ECA support for logging or timber trading is minimal as these are 
not particularly capital-intensive sectors; however they have provided significant support for 
the pulp and paper sector and large infrastructure projects during the last fifteen years, partic-
ularly to controversial expansion projects in Indonesia. Smaller scale pulp mills are typically 
financed purely from domestic and international capital markets, however, mills larger than 
200,000 tonnes per annum are rarely established without the support of public institutions, 
either multilateral development banks or ECAs.6
Although the operators of these projects may not be directly cutting trees illegally, in many 
cases they have indirectly contributed to illegal logging by increasing the demand for raw 
timber to a level which dwarfs the local legal capacity to produce it. Indeed, many of the pulp 
and paper operations in Indonesia and elsewhere were built on the premise of the availability 
of illegal sources of timber. Furthermore, the ECAs ‘seal of approval’ and export guarantee made 
it possible to attract significant private sector investment for projects suffering from extraor-
dinarily risky environmental, social, and financial conditions without the commensurate due 
diligence.  
In the Asian pulp and paper sector particularly, European export credits have supported first 
phase funding for most large greenfield projects and many significant capacity expansions. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) data suggests that, in 1996, officially supported export 
credits accounted for 24 per cent of Indonesia’s external debt (US$ 28.2 billion), having grown 
by 25 per cent between 1992 and 1996. A recent study shows that the pulp and paper industry 
was the second largest recipient (and defaulter) of Indonesian export credits after the power 
sector.7 
The case studies annexed to this paper highlight how the unsustainable expansion of Indone-
sia’s pulp and paper giant Asia Pulp & Paper (APP), resulted in ‘the largest default in emerging 
market history.’ This was made possible by ECAs from the United States, Canada, Japan and six 
European countries, at least four of which still have loans outstanding from the investment. 
6  M. Spek, Financing Pulp Mills: An appraisal of Risk Assessment and Safeguard Procedures, CIFOR, December 2005
7  S. Fried and T. Soentoro, Export Credit Agency Finance Featuring the Mining Oil and Gas Sectors, 2002
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Despite this, ECAs have recently begun to further underwrite APP’s operations, in this case a 
new expansion into China amidst growing concerns over a looming raw material crisis in the 
Chinese pulp and paper sector (see Case Study One (page 25). 
It has also been common practice for pulp and paper mills in Indonesia to double their initial 
production capacity and demand for raw materials within the first years of operating. A major 
expansion usually happens shortly after mill production is ‘on stream’ as this allows them easier 
access to commercial financial markets. This is followed-up with smaller expansions through 
‘de-bottlenecking’ (optimising) production processes.8 For example, between 1994 and 2002, 
pulp mill expansions in Asia accounted for a 46 per cent of the total increase in capacity,9 and 
project documents for the controversial UFS mill (see Case Study Three (page 29)) indicate that 
the company plans to double its planned pulp mill’s capacity in Satui to process 1.2 million 
tonnes of pulp per year.10 While these expansions are not always dependent on ECA backing, 
they are, by and large, expansions to projects that benefited from ECA start-up investment 
or guarantees. This level of rapid expansion dramatically increases demand for raw material 
which it is difficult or impossible to supply legally. This consideration does not appear to be 
currently considered by ECAs in their initial project screening or operator contracts (see case 
studies). 
There have also been many highly controversial projects to build infrastructure in sensitive 
forest areas. For example, the Camisea natural gas project (see Case Study Four (page 33)), 
the first major natural gas development in Peru, is located in one of the world's most ecologi-
cally prized rainforest in the remote Lower Urubamba Valley of the Peruvian Amazon, between 
the Alpurimac Reserve and the Manu National Park. Despite reports of this development 
increasing illegal logging in areas which were not previously accessible, the project has been 
and continues to be supported by significant export credits.
8  D. Hausknost, Der Fall ‘United Fibre System (UFS)’. Die Beteiligung von Andritz und der Raiffeisen an der Zerstoerung der letzten indonesischen 
Regenwaelder, Global 2000, Vienna, 2005, p. 44
9  M. Spek, Financing Pulp Mills, p. 10
10  E. Jurgens/C. Barr/C. Cossalter, Brief on the Planned United Fibre System (UFS) Pulp Mill Project for South Kalimantan, Indonesia, CIFOR, 2005, 
p. 15
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Chapter III
ECA regulation within the OECD 
Despite being public bodies, ECAs have been slow to develop clear guidelines that show 
how they are accountable or will deal with environmental or social risk, even in sensitive 
areas such as forestry. Internationally, ECAs are not subject to any legally enforceable 
social or environmental standards. Even where specific recommendations have been made, 
for instance by the World Commission on Dams, application of them has been ad hoc at 
best.11
Within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ECAs are 
governed through the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, establishing a 
legal and financial framework for export credit provision. Non-fiscal issues (e.g. environmental 
matters, measures to deter bribery and the question of competition from non-OECD ECAs) are 
discussed in the OECD’s Export Credit Group (ECG), providing a forum in which to negotiate 
non-binding common guiding principles, resolve difficulties and improve co-operation 
between national competitors. 
In the last decade most OECD-based ECAs have adopted some policies regarding the envi-
ronmental and social impacts of their business. As a consequence, Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIA) for projects with potentially significant adverse effects are now required, 
or ‘typically required’ for all OECD ECAs. In response to civil society and G8 pressure, the ECG 
undertook to develop its first environmental and social guidelines for ECAs in 1999: the OECD 
Recommendation on Common Approaches on the Environment and Officially Supported 
Export Credits (hereafter ‘Common Approaches’)12 was finally adopted on a voluntary basis by 
all OECD ECAs in late 2003. The Common Approaches aim to level the international playing field 
by identifying and evaluating the environmental and social impacts of ECA-backed projects 
and government projects supported by export credit guarantees or loans of greater than 
10 million SDRs (US$15.3 million or €11.2 million). The latest revision includes the following 
recommendations: 
•	 Projects	should,	in	all	cases,	comply	with	the	environmental	standards	of	the	host	
country. When the relevant international standards against which the project has been 
judged are more stringent, these standards should be applied. 
11  The OECD issued a statement recognising ‘the value of the Core Values and Strategic Priorities of the World Commission on Dams’ after fierce 
opposition from civil society to a new OECD initiative granting financial incentives to large dams without additional safeguards against the negative 
social and environmental impacts. The 2005 OECD Statement on Export Credits and Hydro-power projects is available at :  http://www.oecd.org/docum
ent/41/0,2340,en_2649_34169_35688937_1_1_1_1,00.html
12  Available at: http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2007doc.nsf/linkto/tad-ecg(2007)9 
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•	 Projects	should	be	screened	and	classified	according	to	their	potential	environmental	
impacts. For category A projects (with the potential to have significant adverse 
environmental impacts) ECAs should require an Environmental Impact Assessment and  
make it publicly available thirty calendar days before final commitment to grant project 
support.
•	 The	relevant	international	standards	to	screen	projects	against	are	the	ten	safeguard	
policies developed by the World Bank or, where appropriate, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards, standards of Regional Development Banks, or of 
the European Community. 
However, it should be noted that the Common Approaches are a non-binding recommenda-
tion. Moreover, the recommendation contains a clause (Article 13) that allows member ECAs, 
"should they so decide" to opt out of applying any standards at all, provided they report and 
justify this to the ECG on a semi-annual basis but without any requirement that such cases 
be shared publicly. This derogation clause severely limits the effectiveness of the Common 
Approaches. 
Annex I of the Common Approaches identifies an indicative list of ‘Category A’ projects (those 
requiring an EIA) that includes:
•	 Large-scale	logging;		
•	 Industrial	plants	for	the	production	of	pulp,	paper	and	board	from	timber	or	similar	
fibrous materials with a production capacity exceeding 200 air-dried metric tonnes per day; 
•	 Large-scale	primary	agriculture/sylviculture	involving	intensification	or	conversion	of	
natural habitats; 
•	 Projects	which	are	planned	to	be	carried	out	in	sensitive	locations	or	are	likely	to	have	
a perceptible impact on such locations, even if the project category does not appear in 
the above list. Such sensitive locations include National Parks and other protected areas 
identified by national or international law, and other sensitive locations of international, 
national or regional importance, such as wetlands, forests with high biodiversity value, areas 
of archaeological or cultural significance, and areas of importance for indigenous peoples or 
other vulnerable groups. 
However, the ECG’s annual report from 2004 details three pulp and paper mills as Category 
B investments (compared with five classified as Category A). No EIA is required for Category 
B projects and no further information on the projects (e.g. production capacity) has been 
made public. A public verification of the correct and coherent classification of such projects 
is virtually impossible and the incorrect classification of some projects as category B by some 
ECAs (to avoid more comprehensive due diligence) has already been a point of contention 
among ECAs in the OECD. 
Short-term credit options represent another potential gap in due diligence. They are 
rarely covered by the application of the Common Approaches, as they are invariably identi-
fied as Category C (likely to have minimal or no adverse environmental impacts). As Category 
C projects, they are not subject to voluntary disclosure recommendations, and as such, 
information about them is limited. Unsubstantiated anecdotal evidence from Interna-
tional Crisis Group representatives identifies Belgian ECA, Ducroire, as providing this sort of 
flexible financial support for timber exporters operating out of the Democratic Republic of 
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Congo during its civil war despite the dubious legality of trading in what is known as “conflict 
timber”.13
In June 2007 the OECD issued a revised Recommendation on Common Approaches. The 
number of World Bank group standards that ECAs are required to benchmark projects against 
has increased (from four to ten) and minor changes to both prior and after the fact reporting 
requirements were added to the 2003 version of the Recommendation. However, the retention 
of the derogation clause (Article 13, see above), allowing members to opt out of applying any 
standards at all, with no effective peer review and no public justification, renders the Recom-
mendation ineffective. It appears that ECAs still have little ambition to address the environ-
mental and social impacts of their business through international best practice.
13  Private conversation with author, February 2006
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Chapter IV
ECAs, the forest sector and corruption
Corruption is widely recognised as a key problem underpinning illegal logging in many timber 
producing countries. NGOs such as Global Witness, are increasingly able to document how 
corruption plays a facilitating role in the illegal allocation of concessions, movement and 
export of illegally cut timber and avoidance of judicial action or sanction. Examples of corrup-
tion in the forest sector include:
•	 payment	of	bribes	to	government	officials	and	politicians	for	preferential	treatment	(for	
example award of a procurement contract, a timber concession or a subsidy); 
•	 financial	extortion	by	officials	from	operators	to	artificially	legalise	illegal	operations	
(transportation permits, harvesting licences, forest land use conversion); 
•	 official	decisions	that	favour	certain	groups	(for	instance	when	allocating	timber	
concessions), with the tacit understanding that the group will eventually repay the favour; 
•	 timber	companies	evading	national	regulations	with	relative	impunity,	thanks	to	the	
protection of powerful patrons.’14 
The UK Commission for Africa highlighted the role of ECAs in exacerbating the problem of corrup-
tion and their ‘poor record of using their unique position to encourage better governance’,15 
calling for significant improvements of their existing anti-corruption procedures.
In February 1999 an OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
national Business Transactions, signed by all EU governments came into force.  The Convention 
is open to accession by non-members of the OECD and created a legal requirement that signa-
tories: 
 “take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under 
its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or 
other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, 
for that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting 
in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or 
other improper advantage in the conduct of international business.”16 
14  FAO, Best Practices for Improving Law Compliances in the Forestry Sector, March 2005, pp15
15  UK Commission for Africa, Our Common Interest, March 2005, pp 153
16  OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, March 1999. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3343,fr_2649_34859_2017813_1_1_1_1,00.
html 
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In addition, Article 12 of the Convention provides for monitoring and follow-up to promote 
the full implementation of the Convention, stating “The Parties shall co-operate in carrying 
out a programme of systematic follow-up to monitor and promote the full implementation of 
this Convention.”17  
In December 2000, the ECG responded to this and issued an Action Statement on Bribery, 
recognizing the important role ECAs play in either tolerating or combating corrupt business 
practices. However, the 2000 Statement proved too weak to act as a serious deterrent to corrupt 
business practices and after calls by the Commission for Africa and G8 (issued at the 2005 
Gleneagles summit) to strengthen anti-bribery rules for ECAs, an updated Action Statement 
was adopted in May 200618 and converted into an OECD Recommendation in December.19 
The statement defines the recommended ‘appropriate measures to deter bribery’ as:
•	 informing	exporters	requesting	support	about	the	legal	consequences	of	bribery	under	
its national legal system;
•	 requiring	exporters	to	provide	a	declaration	that	they	have	‘[not]	been	engaged	or	will	
[not]	engage	in	bribery	in	the	transaction’;
•	 requiring	exporters	to	inform	the	ECA	if	they	are	the	subject	of	charges	or	past	
convictions in a national court for bribing a foreign official in a five-year period preceding the 
application;
•	 requiring	exporters	to	disclose	information	on	agents’	fees	and	commissions;
•	 requiring	ECAs	to	verify	whether	an	applicant	appears	on	any	of	the	debarment	lists	of	
the international financial institutions, and in case that it is listed to undertake ‘enhanced due 
diligence’ before proceeding the application;
•	 requiring	ECAs	to	suspend	approval	of	any	application	in	the	event	that	there	is	‘credible	
evidence’ of bribery.
It includes the following sanctions:
“If, before credit, cover or other support has been approved, there is credible evidence 
that bribery was involved in the award or execution, suspending the approval of the 
application […], refuse to approve credit […] and informing their law enforcement 
authorities promptly.
If, after credit, cover or other support has been approved, and bribery has been proven, 
taking appropriate action, such as denial of payment, indemnification, or refund of 
sums provided.” 20 
17  ibid
18  OECD Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees, Action Statement on Bribery and Officially Supported Export Credits, May 
2006, available at: http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2006doc.nsf/43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/8921bcae0049ac4ac125716b00355a46/$FILE/
JT03208704.PDF 
19  OECD Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees: Council Recommendation on Bribery and Officially Supported Export Credits, 
December 2006, available at: http://webdomino1.oecd.org/olis/2006doc.nsf/43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/25bedfd6d02050d2c1257248005
cd463/$FILE/JT03219827.PDF 
20  ibid
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The Action Statement does not require ECAs to debar companies that have been convicted 
for foreign bribery offences, even in cases where those companies have been debarred by the 
World Bank or other international financial institutions. No peer review mechanism has been 
developed for monitoring company undertakings and no processes are in place for the inves-
tigation of local or international NGO allegations of corruption.  
The Statement is supported by a rather feeble set of penalties, which are discretionary and 
inadequately defined. Tellingly there have been no cases brought to date.
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Chapter V
ECAs, the forest sector and 
transparency
The level of publicly available information relating to specific investments supported by ECAs 
varies widely in practice and overall lags behind disclosure policies of other public institu-
tions. 
Some commentators have suggested that the recent adoption of an EU Directive on Public 
Access to Environmental Information21 could be about to change this, for European Member 
State ECAs at least.22 The Directive places legally binding requirements on all public authorities 
to share environmental data with the public, in line with previous commitments to the Aarhus 
Convention.23 However, the Directive protects information that may compromise national 
safety, international relations and the confidentiality of commercial or industrial information 
or intellectual property rights; the latter argument being frequently used against increased 
information disclosure on behalf of ECA clients.
A recent test request for the ex-post release of information about the discretionary application 
of recommended standards to Category A and B projects under this Directive was refused by 
the UK’s ECGD on the grounds that:
“The requested information is subject to Exception 12(5)(a) – International Relations 
of the EIRs and therefore cannot be disclosed. The release of the requested document 
would be prejudicial to the effective conduct of the UK’s international relations in that 
its disclosure would unacceptably damage the UK’s interest in the mutual sharing of 
information between export credit agencies, and undermine the mutual confidence 
serving to buttress the OECD Consensus. Public disclosure of the requested document 
was not envisaged by the contributing countries and disclosure would inhibit the 
level of openness and free and frank exchange of information vital to the effective 
implementation of the Common Approaches of the OECD Working Party on Export 
21  Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information 
available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003L0004:EN:HTML
22  Judith Neyer, Blood From a Stone: Can the new EU Directive on access to information force ECAs to open up? FERN, November 2004. Available 
at: http://www.fern.org/pubs/briefs/Aarhus%20Oct%2004.pdf 
23  The UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
grants the public rights and imposes on Parties and public authorities obligations regarding access to information and public participation and access 
to justice. The Convention was adopted in Aarhus, Denmark in 1998 and at the time of writing 40 countries have ratified. See: http://www.unece.org/
env/pp/ 
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Credits and the functioning of this organisation. The UK’s relationship with other 
countries and an international organisation would be adversely affected.”24 
Improved transparency is a key opportunity for improving the quality and impacts of ECA 
supported projects in the forest sector and beyond. Timely public disclosure of both proposed 
project documents and of the revenues of operations in countries that suffer from poor govern-
ance and illegal logging are likely to lead to more sensitive investment decisions, deter bribery 
and support improved governance in forest departments and central governments (see Export 
credits, the forest sector and corruption, above). 
Unfortunately, the disclosure requirements placed on ECAs through the OECD’s Common 
Approaches (see above) are non-binding, and compliance has been uneven (see Export credits, 
the forest sector and corruption, above). 
To ensure more responsible and equitable management of extractive industries, many interna-
tional financial institutions (IFIs) have started to endorse the principle of (conditional) contract 
and revenue transparency. This is not currently under serious consideration by the ECG despite 
there being a strong business and development case for it, set out in the Extractive Indus-
tries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Guidelines.25 Some recommendations of the EITI have been 
formally endorsed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, the IFC and World Bank Group, the G8 heads of State, the Commis-
sion for Africa and, as the only ECA since September 2006, the U.S. Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC).26 
The IFC requires in its Sustainability policy (para 22) not only public transparency of revenue 
payments from extractive industry projects to host governments, but also the public release 
of relevant terms of public concern in foreign investment contracts, such as Host Government 
Agreements (HGA) and intergovernmental agreements. The IMF also supports disclosure of 
foreign investment contracts, while addressing concerns about the disclosure of confidential 
business information, stating, “the contract terms are likely to be known within the industry 
soon after signing. Little by way of strategic advantage thus seems to be lost through publica-
tion of contracts.”27
These recommendations are specific to the extractive industries, but many similar governance 
challenges are endemic to the forestry sector.
24  Letter from Paul Redmond, Information Officer, ECGD to Nicholas Hildyard, The Corner House, January 2006
25  Available at: http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/eitidraftreportstatement.pdf 
26  OPIC now also commits to make public the standard environmental and social covenants used in Category A Projects, Environmental 
Management and Monitoring Plans, and Environmental Remediation Plans.
27  International Monetary Fund: Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency, June 2005. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/grrt/
eng/060705.htm 
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Chapter VI
The key challenges facing ECAs 
ECAs’ mandate and institutional set-up are both the source of many of the problems this paper 
highlights, and the primary difficulty involved in solving them. This chapter highlights each of 
the issues that are at the heart of ECA’s failure to ensure that their activities are in line with the 
sustainable development commitments of their national governments, and discusses ways in 
which they can be remedied. 
Lack of accountability 
Responsible export credit provision is often undermined by a lack of effective accountability 
policies or mechanisms on the part of both the ECA and the companies they support. 
  
While export credits for greenfield pulp and paper and infrastructure projects are considered 
by many to be a catalyst for additional commercial investment, a single ECA is almost never 
responsible for the total investment required to establish such a project. This makes it hard 
for any single ECA to be held accountable for the impacts of a project supported by an invest-
ment consortium. ECAs also claim that they are, by definition, largely reactive, demand-driven 
institutions typically entering at the ‘tail end’ of the deal process, after project plans are largely 
finalised. If this is the case, then ECAs have limited leeway to seek out socially and environ-
mentally preferable investments.28 However, it is unreasonable to expect a publicly-funded, in 
some cases, fully public body, to operate without clear accountability mechanisms relating to 
the impacts of their work. This is even more pertinent since commercial banks, on the other 
hand, seem to rely largely on ECAs to carry out their social and environmental due diligence for 
them: As one representative of a large German bank recently told a pulp and paper critic, once 
a proposed project has secured a German export guarantee, the banks will fund it without 
much further analysis on their part.29 
The lack of monitoring or auditing requirements in standard ECA contracts undermines 
attempts to ensure that projects meet the financial or environmental projections established 
during the due diligence and EIA processes. Both the IFC and the World Bank’s Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) have contract clauses requiring early repayment of 
28  J. Harmon/C. Maurer/J. Sohn /T. Carbonell: Diverging Paths. What Future for Export Credit Agencies in Development Finance? World Resources 
Institute, 2005
29  ‘Pulp Friction’ New Internationalist Radio Interview with Chris Lang, 09.09.2007. Available at http://www.newint.org/radio/ (last accessed on 
04.10.2007)
Exporting Destruction Export credits, illegal logging and deforestation20
loans if safeguard requirements are not met. This is particularly pertinent given the trend 
towards significant expansion shortly after a pulp and paper project has begun operating. The 
debt-restructuring deal reached between APP and ECAs in April 2005 was widely considered 
generous, despite APP being in the midst of another US$ 3.1 billion expansion in China; facing 
serious concerns over raw material supplies and allegations of illegal logging and corruption; 
and having overall poor corporate and financial governance (see case study I on page 25). This 
suggests that ECAs are still not taking the opportunity to call for operational improvements 
where possible, and poor performance is not currently considered by ECAs a reason to penalise 
those who have benefited from export credits. 
There appears to be a tendency to allocate the role of ‘conscience’ to NGOs rather than to 
develop	effective,	binding	screening/conditionality	procedures	that	would	allow	ECAs	to	make	
responsible decisions about project support.
As with commercial banks, export credit agency transaction costs are expected to be minimal 
and resources are restricted. If issues outside ECAs’ historical remit are to be considered then it 
will be necessary for their staff to be better trained and resourced. 
Lack of coherence between trade promotion polices and the sustainable development 
agenda
ECAs have a primary, and occasionally single, mandate to facilitate exports and overseas 
investments by national business. The oldest ECA, the UK’s Export Credit Guarantee Depart-
ment, derives its powers from the 1919 Export and Investment Guarantees Act,30 which sets 
out the responsibilities relating to supporting the export of goods and services and insuring 
investment, in addition to financial management within the department. There is no reference 
to any impacts of this investment aside from the potential growth in the UK economy. Similarly, 
the OECD Common Approaches preamble includes the following statement:
‘Recognising that while Members may have different means of delivering official 
support for export credits through their export credit agencies (ECAs), the primary 
role of ECAs is to promote trade in a competitive environment, whereas multilateral 
development banks and development agencies focus primarily on development 
assistance.’31
The majority of OECD governments are committed to international development objectives 
such as the Millennium Development Goals, particularly those related to governance issues 
such as corruption and revenue transparency. There is clearly an opportunity for improved 
coherence and co-ordination between the different arms of government on critical issues such 
as governance (including forest governance) in developing countries. This will ensure that 
projects funded by governments through ECAs adhere to the same rules governing corrup-
tion, accountability and transparency.
30  See: www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1991/Ukpga_19910067_en_2.htm#mdiv1  
31  OECD Export Credit Working Group, Recommendation on Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits, pp 1
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Competition from emerging ECAs and the importance of international standards
As with the private-sector investors and insurers that they support, ECAs are facing growing 
international competition. Budding ECAs from emerging countries, particularly China and 
Brazil, have started to challenge their established rivals in the OECD club.32 Western ECAs argue 
that this potentially causes competitive disadvantages for them because these new agencies 
have not committed to international standards on governance or the environment. China, in 
particular, has been accused of securing projects for its companies overseas by undercutting 
the environmental, labour and human rights standards imposed by western institutions.33 
A number of projects and processes seem to support this concern,34 particularly in the African 
forest sector where Chinese buyers have been criticised for buying increasing quantities of 
illegal logs. According to Global Timber, a UK-based website, 80-100 per cent of China’s timber 
imports from Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are illegal.35 It must 
be noted, however, that most of those imports, are re-exported as processed goods onto the 
world’s markets.
China’s ECA, the China Export-Import Bank, established in 1994 is today one of, if not the 
largest ECA and the most important financier of African infrastructure projects. If current 
growth continues it will be issuing over US$40 billion in loans and guarantees annually by 
2010, making it the largest state-supported international financial institution.36 Chinese trade 
with Africa, alone, was worth nearly US$40 billion last year, and is rising fast. China already 
imports 30 per cent of its oil from Africa, mainly from Sudan, Angola and Congo-Brazzaville, 
and ‘when conditions are ripe,’ is looking to negotiate a free-trade agreement with the conti-
nent.37 It is expected that such an agreement would cover a wide range of natural resources 
including timber, Chinese imports of which were valued at US$17.627 billion in 2005.38
The human rights and environmental track record of some of the newcomers’ governments 
and the fact that ever scarcer resources are pushing countries like China into the margins of 
exploration in more politically, socially or environmentally vulnerable areas, highlights the 
importance of developing a binding, international framework for the provision of export 
credits and guarantees. 
Contrary to the claims of many western ECAs, such a process would not have to start from 
scratch. Some extra-OECD agencies have endorsed the Common Approaches and some 
32  Scandinavian ECAs in particular (Finnvera, EKN, and SEK) have noted increase competition from China in financing Asian pulp and paper mills, 
citing the UFS case-study as a case in point. Scandinavian ECAs had not been consulted about participating in the financing of the project, despite the 
supply of machinery from European engineering firms. See: Feeding China’s Growing Demand for Wood Pulp: CIFOR Workshop Report, March 2004. 
Available at: http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/research/governance/foresttrade/Attachment50-Europe_Consultative_wshop_
Brussels_24Mar04.pdf 
33  Philippe Maystadt, President of the European Investment Bank, claimed in a recent interview that Chinese banks had snatched projects from 
under his bank’s nose in Africa by undercutting the EIB’s labour and environmental standards: “…the competition with Chinese banks is obvious. We 
are talking about institutions that do not pay any attention to the environmental and social standards of projects, as we would do.” Financial Times, EIB 
accuses China of unscrupulous loans, 28 November 2006
34  For example, in 2003, the Sudanese government sought and received financial support from China Exim Bank ($520 million) for the Merowe 
Dam, a large hydropower project for which Western export credit agencies declined support because of its likely social and environmental impacts.
35  http://www.globaltimber.org.uk/ChinaIllegalImpExp.htm 
36  For more information about China’s export credit agency see: P. Bosshard, China’s Role in Financing African Infrastructure, IRN, May 2007
37  No Questions Asked: Human Rights No Bar to China’s Hunt for Resources, The Economist 19 January 2006
38  Favourable Balance of Forest Products Trade in 2005, China.org.cn, 22 February 2006
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ambitious developing country banks are declaring they have more rigorous screening criteria 
than international standards call for.39 China Exim Bank adopted its own environmental policy 
in November 2004 and released it to the public in April 2007. The policy stipulates the review 
of environmental impacts before, during and after project implementation. China Exim Bank 
also does not cite any financial threshold in its policy, potentially allowing for a broader scope 
of environmental screening.40 While China Exim’s environmental policy offers little guidance 
as to its practical implementation, the principles it espouses are stricter than the OECD recom-
mendation on export credits and the environment in that they cover more than mere ex-ante 
assessment of expected impacts. 
China declared that it is not prepared to accept obligations regarding export credits that the 
OECD, of which it is not a member, has developed. But it has expressed an interest in training 
and joint projects with World Bank institutions to learn more about the implementation of 
international environmental standards.41 
A level international playing field, established jointly with non-OECD countries in a truly inter-
national forum may therefore be the most effective way to manage the negative impacts of 
investment supported by governments through export credits. However, for this to happen, 
OECD countries need to lead by example. A coherent and stringent application of existing OECD 
environmental and social standards, including those international environmental agreements 
and conventions to which OECD members subscribe, must be the first step in this process. 
 
39  For example Banco Itau in Brazil, besides adhering to the Equator Principle requirements, explicitly declares that it goes beyond the Principles 
in extending screening to all projects valued at 5 million Reales (about $2.6 million) or more. 
40  “China Exim Bank is paying high-level of attention to our funded projects’ environmental impacts. We enhance environmental monitoring 
and management before, during and after the project implementation.” For a comprehensive assessment of China Exim’s environmental policy see: 
International Rivers Network/Environmental Defense, http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/1677. Available at: http://www.irn.org/pdf/
finance/070916exim.pdf 
41  ibid
Exporting Destruction Export credits, illegal logging and deforestation 23
Chapter VII
Recommendations
In order for ECAs to stop causing harm and fulfil the full range of their responsibilities as 
Government agencies, the following actions must be taken at the national, regional and inter-
national level:
ECAs involved in forest sector investment
 
•	 Develop	adequate	in-house	capacity	to	critically	assess	the	quality	of	Environmental	
Impact Assessments as well as additional documentation, analysis and assessments supplied 
by clients. 
•	 Require	any	company	seeking	support	to	provide	credible	and	independent	analysis	
demonstrating the availability of legal and sustainable wood sources for all raw material. This 
should include independent information on land conflicts affecting that supply, assumptions 
about annual growth rates, and expected impacts on natural forests; to be received and 
approved before an agreement is made to finance a pulp and paper project. 
•	 Critically	assess	the	track-record	of	project	operators	and	companies	seeking	cover	
for investments, with a view to refusing support for companies which operate illegally or 
contravene national or international commitments to forest protection and indigenous 
rights.  Such analysis should also evaluate previous compliance against applicable legal 
norms regarding financial management. 
ECAs in the OECD’s Export Credit Group
•	 Adopt	binding	transparency	policies	that	ensure	the	timely	public	disclosure	of	
proposed project documents (including all legislation, rules and regulations, concession 
maps and concession details) and of revenue from forest-related development projects. 
•	 Adopt	and	implement	significantly	strengthened	anti-bribery	policies	and	measures	
to act as an effective deterrent to corrupt business practices in the forest sector as part of 
the ongoing review of OECD’s instruments in combating bribery in international business 
transactions.
•	 Create	an	exclusion	list	including	projects:	
  – operating in or in immediate proximity of National Parks and other protected areas 
identified by national or international law;
  – in High Conservation Value Forests (including wetlands, forests with high 
biodiversity value, areas of archaeological or cultural significance, and areas of 
importance for indigenous peoples or other vulnerable groups);
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  – on disputed lands or where companies that have been convicted of illegal logging, 
are in the midst of unresolved land right conflicts, or where it cannot be proved that 
indigenous peoples have been granted their right to free prior informed consent.
  – that aim to convert forests to palm oil projects (is in line with Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO)).
•	 Ensure	that	their	policies	are	developed	in	partnership	with	members	of	the	private	
sector, national and international civil society groups and those representing communities 
from affected areas.
•	 Enter	into	a	dialogue	with	non-OECD	countries	with	a	view	to	establishing	an	
international level playing field on all of the above issues.
Governments of EU Member States
•	 Develop	specific	definitions	of	ECA	due	diligence	to	ensure	they	have	environmental	
and social screening procedures in place that guarantee projects will not lead to illegal forest 
sector activity (this is in line with the recommendations of the EU Forest Law Enforcement 
Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan).
•	 Identify	ways	to	request	ECAs	and	other	public	lending	bodies	to	obtain	better	
information about forest sector investments and the associated risks (as recommended by 
the EU Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan.)
•	 Develop	a	proposal	for	legislative	instruments	for	gathering	data	on	the	impact	ECAs’	
forest sector investments are having on climate change. (This is in line with demands of the 
2007	European	Parliament	Resolution	on	Trade	and	Climate	Change	(2007/2003(INI)).
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Case Study I
Asia Pulp & Paper
Indonesia: Accountability and debt 
restructuring
APP Indonesia
Although its headquarters are in Singapore, 
Asia Pulp & Paper (APP) is the holding 
company for the pulp and paper interests 
of Sinar Mas, one of Indonesia’s largest 
business groups. Since the early 1980s, APP 
has developed its pulp and paper production 
capacity in Indonesia and is now expanding 
into paper and board production in China (see 
case study II on page 27) and, allegedly, for 
fiber sourcing, Cambodia.
APP Indonesia accounts for 2.3 million 
tons of pulp per year and is one of the ten 
largest producers worldwide. The company 
led Indonesia’s pulp and paper boom that 
commenced in the 1980s and has been 
centrally implicated in the largely illegal 
deforestation of 60 percent of Sumatra’s 
tropical lowland forest between 1990 
and 2002.42 APP’s boom was built on the 
availability of illegal wood obtained from 
clear-cutting natural forests43 and mills in 
Sumatra currently continue to draw roughly 
70 percent of their raw material from mixed 
tropical hardwood harvested from natural 
forests.44 It is estimated that a significant 
proportion of this is logged illegally, much of it 
in national parks and protected areas.45
42   E. Jurgens/C. Barr/C. Cossalter, Brief on UFS, p. 3
43  Between 1988 and 1999 this accounts for 92 per cent of the raw 
material. See E. Matthew/J.W. Van Gelder, Paper Tiger, Hidden Dragons. The 
responsibility of international financial institutions for Indonesian forest 
destruction, social conflict and the financial crisis of Asia Pulp & Paper, 
Friends of the Earth England, May 2001, p 4
44  E. Jurgens/C. Barr/C. Cossalter, Brief on UFS, p.17
45  World Bank, Indonesia: Environment and Natural Resource 
Management in a Time of Transition, Washington D.C. 2001
The Indah Kiat project
APP/Sinar	Mas	owns	and	operates	one	of	
Indonesia’s largest pulp and paper plants, 
Indah Kiat in Riau Province, Sumatra, with an 
annual production capacity of 2 million tonnes 
of pulp and 700,000 tonnes of paper.46 For 
years, the mill had been subject to allegations 
of illegal logging and sourcing and in 1993 
was fined US$1.4 million for the use of illegal 
timber.47 
ECA support
The massive expansion of the Indonesian 
pulp and paper industry (a nine-fold increase 
between 1988 and 1999) was made possible 
by international investment of more than 
US$15 billion during the 1990s.48 ECAs 
contributed significantly to this unsustainable 
expansion by reducing commercial banks’ 
exposure and undermining the requirement 
for effective financial diligence or impact 
assessments.49 Specifically, ECAs from Austria, 
46  J. Wieting, Clearcut Paper. APP, APRIL and the End of the 
Rainforest in Sumatra’s Riau Province, Results of ROBIN WOOD Research, 
July 2004
47  R. Carrere and L. Lohmann, Pulping the South. Industrial Tree 
Plantations and the World Paper Economy, London, 1996, p.220
48  E. Matthew/J.W. Van Gelder, Paper Tiger, Hidden Dragons, p.4
49  ibid, p. 5. See also: S. Fried/T. Soentoro, Export Credit Finance in 
Indonesia, Environmental Defense and Bioforum, December 2000
Demonstration against German ECA support 
for unsustainable pulp mills in Indonesia 
Photo: Barabara Happe/urgewald
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Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, 
Spain, Sweden and the US financed the 
expansion of Indah Kiat’s pulp and paper 
capacity by guaranteeing export credits 
and extending loans. After the default and 
debt standstill of APP in 2001, commercial 
banks forced the ECAs to take over their 
outstanding debt. As a consequence, many 
ECAs  still have loans outstanding from APP’s 
Indonesian operations including ECAs from 
Austria, Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Sweden, and the US; and further undisclosed 
outstanding loans are likely for ECAs from 
Denmark and Spain.50
Debt restructuring and continued 
expansion
In 2001, global paper prices dropped 
significantly and APP infamously collapsed 
when it was unable to pay its US$13.9 
billion debt. This remains the largest ever 
default by a single company in an emerging 
country.51 Despite this, a number of factors 
including the company’s importance to 
50  Jan Willem van Gelder, Export credits and illegal logging. Data 
prepared for Chatham House and FERN, Profundo, January 2006, updated 
March 2008
51  Asia’s Worst Deal, Michael Shari, Business Week, New York, 13 
August 2001
the Indonesian national economy and the 
political connections of its owners, meant 
that APP managed to strike a favourable 
debt restructuring deal.52 As detailed above, 
international ECAs were, and remain, 
significant APP creditors and they reportedly 
played an important role in the debt 
restructuring process. Under the deal that 
emerged in April 2005, APP’s Indonesian 
subsidiaries will repay the greater part of their 
debts within 13 years, while the remainder will 
be repaid in 18 to 22 years. Local civil society 
as well as the World Bank called for such a 
deal to be conditional upon a downsizing 
and restructuring of the sector and the 
legal verification of raw supplies, but these 
requirements were not included.
Seven years after its collapse, and only three 
years after the debt restructuring deal was 
signed, APP is currently in the midst of a 
US$3.1 billion expansion program in China, 
with some of the same ECAs that paid for the 
earlier expansion supporting the export of 
new machinery from Europe. The Sinar Mas 
Group aims to increase its global paper and 
board production capacity to reach 10 million 
tonnes per year by 2010 and most of this new 
capacity will be built in China.53 According to 
the project literature, raw material will come 
from plantations, but concerns have been 
raised by NGOs and forest analysts that there 
are insufficient plantation stocks to match 
aimed for levels of productivity which would 
lead to a significant gap in legal fibre supply 
in the region. This concern does not appear to 
have been considered by the European ECAs 
supporting this sector.
52  E. Jurgens/C. Barr/C. Cossalter, Brief on the Planned UFS Pulp Mill 
Project
53  Nie Xiaorong, A glimpse of the future in China. Two new APP mills. 
Solutions – for People, Processes and Paper, April 2005
Pollution from pulp mill in Indonesia
Photo:Barabara Happe/urgewald
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Case Study II
Jinhai pulp and paper plant 
in Hainan province, China
Overcapacity and unsecured fibre 
sourcing
The project
The Hainan Jinhai Pulp & Paper plant  on 
Hainan Island started production in November 
2004. The joint venture between APP and the 
Hainan Forestry General Corporation is the 
world’s largest single-line pulp facility with a 
capacity of over one million tonnes per year 
of bleached hardwood kraft (BHK) pulp. With 
current average production rates of 3,200 
tonnes per day the plant swallows around a 
truckload (30 cubic meters) of wood chips 
a minute.54 Roughly one third of the mill’s 
output is sold on the domestic market,  
with the remaining 70 percent being 
channelled to APP’s other paper and board 
mills in China.55
The Austrian company Andritz supplied the 
wood-processing and pulp-drying facilities 
and Swedish company Kvaerner Pulping the 
complete fibre line. Other foreign suppliers 
to the mill are Kvaerner Power, ABB, Siemens, 
Andritz, Foster Wheeler, BTG, Veolia Water, 
FL Schmidt, Rexroth, Hagglunds, Sulzer 
Pumps and Aker Kvaerner Chemetics.56 Total 
investments in the project amounted to 10.2 
billion renminbi (US$1.3 billion).57
54  The Experiences of the world’s biggest Recovery Boiler in Yang Pu 
at Hainan Jinhai Pulp & Paper Co., K. Haaga/ M. Laitinen, Kvaerner Power 
Oy, Presentation at the 7th International Colloquium on Black Liquor 
Combustion and Gasification, University of Jyväskylä, July 31-August 2, 
2006
55  Brussels, 4 October 2005, paperloop.com
56  G. Rodden, The Birth Of A Giant, PPI, April 2006
57  Jinhai Pulp and Paper Plant Put into Operation formally, SinoCast, 
Hainan, 31 March 2005; Website APP China (en.app.com.cn), Viewed in 
March 2008
In 2006 Hainan Jinhai announced it aims to 
boost the plant's pulp capacity from 1 million 
to 1.78 million tonnes per year and build up 
a fine paper and tissue capacity of almost 
2 million tonnes per year to make the mill 
an integrated facility in the next few years. 
The cost of the investments will total 13.6 
billion renminbi (US$ 1.8 billion). Two fine 
paper machines are ordered from Voith Paper 
(Germany) and six tissue paper machines were  
ordered from A. Celli (Italy).58
ECA support
In 2004, Euler Hermes (Germany) issued 
an export credit guarantee to the German 
company Voith Paper for the sale of a paper 
machine to APP’s Gold East Paper mill, 
apparently having learnt nothing from the 
debacle of it’s involvement with APP in 
Indonesia’s operations (see above).59 The Gold 
East mill in Jiangsu province is likely to be 
supplied by Hainan as they are relatively close 
and under the same management.
58  APP China Plans Huge Investment At Hainan, PPI, June 2007
59  China Gold East Paper To Invest $500 Mln in Paper Making Line, 
Chinese News Digest, Beijing, 13 April 2004; Übersicht über die endgültig 
angenommenen Geschäfte 2004, Euler Hermes, Frankfurt, February 2005
Outside the Jinhai Pulp & Paper Plant. A truck 
waiting to sell its timber from natural forests 
to the Jinhai plant.
Photo: ZHONG Yu /Greenpeace
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In May 2006 Euler Hermes again issued 
an export credit guarantee to the German 
company Voith Paper for the supply of a 
paper machine to China, probably to the 
Hainan Jinhai plant.60 The Export Import 
Bank of the United States approved an 
export credit guarantee in 1996 for Ningbo 
Zhonghua Paper, a paperboard mill in Jiangsu 
province that doubled production capacity 
to 1.2 million tones per year.61 With every 
additional pulp and paper mill in the same 
region, the pressure on natural forests in the 
area will naturally increase. ECAs seem to 
be supporting APP’s expansion into China 
without learning lessons from Indonesia.62
Fibre supplies and allegations of illegality
The Hainan mill does not have a secure 
purchasing policy for its raw material. APP 
China started investing in Hainan Island’s 
increasing plantation capacity as early as 
1997, however, there have been severe raw 
material shortages at the Jinhai plant since 
it started operating. APP China has been 
granted concessions totalling 233,333 ha but 
only 6,667 ha of eucalyptus plantations appear 
to have been established, rather than the 
64,667 hectares the company claims.63 Shortly 
after the mill began operating, local civil 
society began to gather evidence suggesting 
that illegal logging was on the increase 
in Hainan’s natural forests. Both domestic 
environmental groups and the Chinese media 
have repeatedly accused APP of engaging 
in illegal activities in Hainan province to 
overcome the shortage of woodchips required 
for the mill to operate at its optimal level. 
While a Greenpeace investigation in 2005 did 
60  Website AuslandsGeschäftsAbsicherung der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (www.agaportal.de), Viewed in March 2008
61  Meeting Of The Board Of Directors - Summary Of Minutes, Export-
Import Bank Of The United States, Washington, 10 September 1996
62  For most recent reports on continuing destructive activities by APP 
see: Eyes on the Forest to Asia Pulp and Paper, investigative report, Eyes on 
the Forest, March 2008
63  Greenpeace China, The investigative report into Asia Pulp and 
Paper (APP) in South China’s Hainan Province, May 2005
not directly attribute illegal logging in the 
area to APP China’s subsidiary Jinhua Forestry 
Company, there is evidence that land cleared 
illegally has ended up being used for APP’s 
pulp plantations.
The Hainan plant requires 12,000 tonnes 
of timber per day. However, during the six 
months prior to the mill going officially on 
stream, only one million tonnes of chip stocks 
had been built up, meaning the mill could 
only be sustained for three months.64  In the 
light of this, APP opened negotiations with 
local individual and community landowners 
to attempt to acquire further timber stocks 
and plantation land. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that these negotiations have not yet 
resulted in secure supplies. In the meantime 
it appears that APP has resorted to a range 
of other questionable if not outright illegal 
efforts to bridge Jinhai’s supply gap. A 2002 
government policy designed to return land 
to forests is being used to clear natural forest 
for pulp plantations. In August 2003 around 
a hundred people were caught clearing 
forests in a National Park. They had been 
hired by APP to make way for pulp trees. This 
was approved by the provincial government 
and disguised under the ‘returning land to 
forest’ programme. This is not an isolated 
case: The Hainan Forestry Bureau found 
that 60 percent of the area allocated for 
reforestation had been planted with fast 
growing pulp plantations.65 Greenpeace China 
and national newspapers further reported 
that the Hainan provincial government has 
started implementing plans to cut down the 
forests that line the Island’s 20,000 km of 
main roads. The roadside forests, intended 
to protect the roadbed from wind and water 
erosion, will be replaced with fast-growing 
eucalyptus, which will be harvested after 4 to 
6 years for the Hainan pulp mill. The provincial 
government is hoping to provide another 
64  ibid, p. 2
65  ibid, p.4
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26,666 ha plantation land to APP by clearing 
the windbreaks.66 In a 2007 investigation, 
Greenpeace China further found that during 
the last two years, APP illegally clear-cut 
several hundred hectares of natural forest 
inside Hainan’s Wuzhishan Natural Reserve67 
and a large area of forest in the Yinggeling 
Natural Reserve68 and replaced it with 
monoculture eucalyptus plantations. 
APP China denies accusations that its Jinhai 
plant suffers from a shortage of woodchips 
and that it has cut down natural forests 
to channel to the mill. However, APP also 
denied other Greenpeace China reports into 
illegal logging by APP in Yunnan province 
which were later confirmed by official State 
Forestry Administration investigations. As 
the province’s Forest Bureau points out, in 
Hainan ‘pulp forests are synonymous with APP’s 
forests.’ 69 
There is also evidence that China’s expanding 
demand for raw materials will also put 
pressure on timber capacity outside of China. 
A recent CIFOR assessment of pulp industry 
expansion and fibre demand in Southern 
China concludes that adequate Chinese 
plantations will not be available in the short 
or mid-term, meaning that Southern China 
will remain largely reliant on imported wood 
chips beyond 2009. The paper warns ‘There 
might be strong temptation, on the part of 
certain players, to fulfill their fibre gap from 
non-sustainable sources, from countries with 
governance problems’.70 The bulk of this wood 
is likely to be imported from Indonesia, where 
APP and its subsidiary Sinar Mas is the largest 
66  Singapore, 11 April 2005, paperloop.com
67  Liu Bing, APP China, Greenpeace China, May 2007
68  Paper Giant APP Accused of Illegal China Logging, Reuters News 
Service, 29 March 2007
Soon after the Greenpeace allegations, the illegal logging in Yinggeling 
Natural Reserve has been confirmed by the State Forestry Administration.
69  Greenpeace China: Investigative report into APP, May 2005
70  C. Cossalter, Pulp Industry Expansion and New Wood Fibre 
Demand in Southern China. Implications for the Region, presentation at 
the Conference on Future of Forests in East Asia and China, Kuala Lumpur, 
CIFOR, October 2004
national pulp producer; and Cambodia, where 
an alleged APP subsidiary was found to have 
illegally felled thousands of cubic meters of 
timber in the country’s Botum Sakor National 
Park in 2005.71 The Hainan Jinhai plant also 
imports wood chips from Australia and 
Vietnam.72
71  APP faces illegal logging allegations in China, Cambodia, Dow 
Jones Newswire, Jakarta 3 February 2005
72  APP China Plans Huge Investment At Hainan, PPI, June 2007
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Case Study III
United Fiber System
Indonesia: Corruption and 
misestimation
United Fiber System Ltd. (UFS) is a Singapore-
listed former construction company without 
any previous experience in pulp and paper 
production. It is majority owned by a group 
of Swedish businessmen and in a recent, 
complicated reverse takeover, has acquired 
areas in Indonesia designated as ‘pulp 
plantations’, and forest concessions for a  pulp 
mill in South Kalimantan, the Satui pulp mill.  
The projects
UFS has been looking to secure financing for 
the 600,000 tons per year greenfield pulp mill 
project in Satui, South Kalimantan, for years 
but now appears to be making progress. 
In July 2007, Abax Global Capital, a newly 
launched Hong Kong-based hedge fund 
announced the provision of US$ 225 million 
in the form of notes and convertible bonds 
to this project as one of its first actions.73 
In February 2008, UFS also announced 
the signing of a turnkey contract for the 
pulp mill project with a subsidiary of the 
Chinese company China Metallurgical Group 
Corporation - this contract replaces an earlier 
turnkey contract signed in 2004 with another 
Chinese company, China National Machinery 
& Equipment Import & Export Corporation 
(CMEC).74 
In 2004, UFS also announced the construction 
and operation of a 700,000 tonnes wood chip 
73  United Fiber enters $225 million financing with Abax, 
AsianInvestor Magazine, 25 July 2007, Announcement, United Fiber 
System, Singapore, 13 July 2007 
74  MCC20 Appointed Turnkey Contractor For MBBM Pulp Mill, 
Announcement United Fiber System, Singapore, 24 February 2008
plant on the island of Pulau Laut, off the coast 
of South Kalimantan. The facility has begun 
production in April 2007 but appears to have 
problems with its port among other issues. 75
In addition, since 2005, UFS has repeatedly 
announced its intention to acquire and 
operate the existing pulp mill Kiani Kertas in 
East Kalimantan – so far unsuccessfully.
Kiani Kertas was built in the late 1990s as 
part of the business empire of Muhammad 
‘Bob’ Hasan, a close business associate of ex 
Indonesian President Suharto and, prior to 
his felony conviction and prison terms, one 
of Indonesia’s most powerful “timber barons”. 
The pulp and paper mill started operations in 
1997, by which time roughly US$1,300 million 
had been invested in the project, including 
an export credit guarantee for machinery by 
the Finnish ECA. The mill was reported to be 
one of the most expensive mill construction 
projects in Indonesia with extraordinary levels 
of “mark up”. It never operated at capacity and 
did not have a sufficient legal local source of 
timber. Company reports indicated that the 
mill claimed to be importing timber feedstock 
75  Press release: Indonesian forestry official admits lack of raw 
material supply for UFS chip mill, by CAPPA, WALHI Kalsel, Global2000, 
Environmental Defense, December 2006
Deforestation and fire scars on a peatland 
forest in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia
Photo: H.-D. Viktor Boehm
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from overseas. 76 In 2004 the mill stopped 
production as a result of mismanagement and 
inadequate fibre supplies. It is now owned by 
a group of investors led by Prabowo Subianto, 
formerly one of Suharto’s son-in-laws and 
head of Indonesia’s notoriously brutal special 
forces, the Kopassus. The group bought the 
mill with a US$201m loan from Bank Mandiri, 
Indonesia's largest lender. The loan is now one 
of the bank's principal non-performing deals 
and the subject of a criminal investigation.77 
UFS expressed an interest in acquiring Kiani 
Kertas in 2004 and claims it has secured 
sufficient funding for the take-over despite 
JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank and Merill Lynch 
pulling out of the project under pressure 
over its environmental impact and the risk 
of illegal logging. It is still not clear whether 
UFS will succeed in its takeover bid, but 
whoever acquires Kiani Kertas will need to 
invest significantly in replacement machinery 
and further expansion is possible. It is likely 
that European ECAs will be invited to provide 
support for the export of machinery at this 
point,78 despite the fact that this mill involves 
a significant number of “politically exposed 
persons” and convicted felons, thus triggering 
substantial anti-money laundering due 
diligence requirements.79
In 2006, the World Bank concluded that 
“forest loss and forest crime dominate the 
[Indonesian	forestry]	sector”,80 and that 
“Indonesia is losing forests at a remarkable 
rate, one of the fastest in the world.”81 It also 
estimated that as much as two-thirds of 
76  S. Fried, Memorandum on Environmental, Social, and Financial 
Risks Associated with the UFS pulp and wood chip mills and the proposed 
UFS acquisition of the Kiani Kertas mill, Environmental Defense, November 
2006. Available at: http://pulpinc.files.wordpress.com/2007/01/ufs-ngo-
letter-18-nov-06.pdf 
77  Merrill turns down UFS over Kiani funding, Financial Times, 22 
February 2006
78  J.W. van Gelder, Data prepared for Chatham House and FERN
79  S. Fried, Memorandum on Environmental, Social, and Financial 
Risks Associated with Kiani Kertas, ibid
80  World Bank, Sustaining Indonesia’s Forests: Strategy for the World 
Bank, 2006 – 2009, June 2006, p 8
81  ibid, p 11
Indonesia’s timber production was based 
on illegal and undocumented sources. Its 
summing up stated that “industrial timber 
demand exceeds sustainable supply… timber 
plantations are insufficient and performing 
poorly…82	[and]	forest	conversion	–	an	
unsustainable harvest method – has been the 
fastest growing source of timber supply in 
recent years and is a major source of supply 
for pulp mills.”83 The East Kalimantan region 
already faces significant over-capacity in its 
paper sector, with the Pulau Laut mill already 
running, the likelihood of a second mill 
acquiring secure legal supplies is minimal. 
ECA involvement
The contract to build a woodchip mill on Pulau 
Laut island in South Kalimantan was awarded 
to the Chinese company China National 
Machinery & Equipment Import & Export 
Corporation (CMEC) for a total value of US$ 39 
million. The project was financed by a supplier 
credit of US$18 million from CMEC and a loan 
of US$ 21 million from Raiffeisen Zentralbank 
Austria. Andritz has provided machinery worth 
US$ 20 million.84 
In 2004 a turn-key contract for the planned 
pulp mill in Satui, South Kalimantan was 
signed with CMEC for a total value of 
US$863 million; an export credit guarantee 
from Sinosure was granted to CMEC for the 
insurance of the project; and pulp machinery 
for the mill with a value of US$250 million will 
be provided by Austrian Andritz.
An application to the World Bank’s Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) for 
political risk insurance for the mill was 
almost successful, and other ECAs such as 
China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation 
(Sinosure) also looked into providing 
82  ibid, p 8
83  ibid
84  Annual report 2004, United Fiber System, Singapore, March 2005.
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insurance. According to CIFOR, informed 
sources at MIGA suggest that the UFS deal 
was very nearly guaranteed by the Agency 
but because of concerns over unsecured legal 
fibre supplies, UFS withdrew its application 
in March 2004. Critically, the project was 
not initially rejected by MIGA’s internal due 
diligence or internal impact assessment 
process.85 In 2006, MIGA engaged in talks with 
UFS again, but have now concluded that it 
is unlikely that they will provide any support 
for this project.86  Regarding the question 
of International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
finance for the UFS or Kiani Kertas projects, 
the World Bank’ Indonesia Director replied that 
“the IFC would have to be crazy to support 
this project.”87 OeKB, the Austrian ECA had 
been approached for funding after the initial 
MIGA defeat but appears to have rejected the 
project on environmental grounds. 
Recently, in February 2008, the turn-key 
contract with CMEC was replaced by a new 
turn-key contract with another Chinese 
company, China Metallurgical Group 
Corporation. This construction company 
85  S. Spek, Financing Pulp Mills, December 2005
86  Meeting with Walhi South Kalimantan, NADI, Solidaritas 
Perempuan, Environmental Defense, September 2006
87  ibid
has accepted the responsibility to provide 
a suppliers credit for the US$ 863 million 
project.88 This credit will probably be sourced 
from Bank of China, which in March 2008 
agreed to provide a credit line of 55 billion 
yuan to finance the foreign activities of China 
Metallurgical Group.89 But ECAs might also be 
approached again.
Fibre supply and expansion plans
UFS claims that the proposed mills will source 
fibre entirely from sustainably-managed 
plantations with minimal negative impact on 
natural forests and communities. However, 
research by Finnish forestry consultancy 
Jaakko Poyry, and many independent 
evaluations, including by the CGIAR Center 
for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), 
have shown that it will not be possible to 
source the necessary quantity of pulpwood 
from its existing legal plantations timber 
sources. Their findings demonstrate that 
UFS has significantly overestimated the 
standing volume of pulpwood within existing 
plantation concessions, the annual rate of 
plantation establishment, as well as growth 
projections for second and third rotations 
at the site.90 A shortfall of at least 132,916 
ha of existing acacias,91 and significant 
damage suffered to the current plantation 
area (through fire, illegal mining and oil palm 
plantations) means that the mills are expected 
to run out of plantation fibre within five years 
of operation.92 In both the short and the long 
term, the mill will require significant additional 
supplies of fibre, placing direct pressure on the 
88  MCC20 Appointed Turnkey Contractor For MBBM Pulp Mill, 
Announcement United Fiber System, Singapore, 24 February 2008
89  Strategic Cooperation Agreement was inked between MCC and 
Bank of China, Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, 12 March 2008
90  Jaakko Poyry Management Consulting, Valuation of PT Menara 
Hutan Buana Future Operations in South Kalimantan, Indonesia, January 
2001; E. Jurgens/C. Barr/C. Cossalter, Brief on UFS, 2005; S. Fried, 
Memorandum on Environmental, Social, and Financial Risks Associated 
with Kiani Kertas, p. 12
91  Estimate by Global 2000/Friends of the Earth Austria based on 
calculations by JP, CIFOR and industry insiders in South Kalimantan. D. 
Hausknost, Der Fall UFS, 2005
92  E. Jurgens/C. Barr/C. Cossalter, Brief on UFS, p. 10
Families living downstream of pulp mill 
project in Indonesia
Photo: Barabara Happe/urgewald
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113,000 ha of natural forest that remains in the 
concession area, including 44,000 ha of mixed 
tropical hardwood as well as other forests in 
Kalimantan and elsewhere in Indonesia.93 
The already significant gap between fibre 
demand and supply in Satui is further 
increased by the UFS wood chip mill on Pulau 
Laut that has recently begun production.  
Planning projections for the mill outline the 
intention to sell woodchips produced from 
some of the same plantations designated for 
the pulp mill in Satui.94 Project documents 
also indicate that UFS appears to be planning 
to double the Satui pulp mill’s capacity to 
process 1.2 million tonnes per year shortly 
after construction.95 Such an expansion will 
not only increase the likelihood of illegal 
logging in surrounding natural forests but 
force UFS to import significant volumes of raw 
material from elsewhere in the region. 
In light of these figures, UFS’s announcement 
of July 2005 that it will also acquire and 
operate the existing pulp mill Kiani Kertas 
in East Kalimantan reduces the company’s 
claims about the sustainable sourcing of its 
pulpwood to absurdity: now UFS will have to 
run two mills with already insufficient wood 
resources. 
93  ibid, p. V
94  ibid, P. 10
95  ibid, p. 15
Case Study IV
Camisea – Peru
Unresolved land issues and the 
destruction of intact forests 
The project
At a total cost of US$1.7 billion, the first phase 
of the Camisea natural gas project involved 
the construction of gas wells, a processing 
plant and two parallel pipelines to the 
Peruvian coast. The wells are estimated to hold 
around 13 trillion cubic feet of gas, with more 
than 480 million barrels of associated natural 
gas liquids (propane, butane and condensate). 
The project would link a collection of fields by 
pipelines, providing natural gas and natural 
gas liquids for domestic consumption and for 
export. The gas pipelines run 714 kilometers 
from the Camisea field to Lima on the coast, 
while the liquids pipeline runs 540 kilometers 
to a port south of Lima. Critically, parts of 
the pipelines have been sited in one of the 
world's most ecologically prized rainforest 
in the remote Lower Urubamba Valley of 
the Peruvian Amazon. According to the 
Smithsonian Institute, the biodiversity of the 
An indigenous family in Poyentimari.
Photo: Aaron Goldzimer/Environmental Defense
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Camisea region is unsurpassed in the world; 
moreover, the gas development area (Blocks 
88 and 56) covers areas which are subject 
to legally-protected tenure rights of several 
groups of un-contacted indigenous peoples 
that have chosen to remain isolated.
The first phase project has been operational 
since August 2004, during which time it has 
been criticised for poor construction standards 
by a Peruvian Congressional Commission96 
and condemned for systemic failures to 
protect indigenous populations from adverse 
social impacts and human rights violations. 
Despite these concerns, plans are currently 
underway to expand it by developing a 
liquefaction plant on the Peruvian coast to 
convert natural gas in liquid natural gas for 
export for export to US and Mexican markets.
The Peru LNG project, valued at US$ 3.9 billion, 
is undertaken by a consortium of Hunt Oil 
(United States), SK Corporation (South Korea), 
Marubeni (Japan) and Repsol YPF (Spain). In 
January 2007, a US$ 1.5 billion construction 
contract was awarded to the American 
company Chicago Bridge & Iron.97In order to 
supply gas to the LNG plant, the operating 
companies have begun to develop a new 
block of gas fields adjacent to the original 
project (known as Block 56 or Camisea II). The 
pipeline to transport this gas to the LNG plant 
is supplied by the Indian company Welspun 
Gujarat Stahl Rohren.98
Peru LNG’s owners will provide approximately 
US$ 1.5 billion for the US$ 3.8 billion project 
and are seeking to raise approximately US$ 2.3 
billion of long-term loans. Significant amounts 
96  Peru Congressional Commission Confirms Inadequate Pipeline 
Construction, Amazon Watch, June 2006. Available at: http://www.
amazonwatch.org/newsroom/view_news.php?id=1175 
97  International Consortium Led by Hunt Oil Company Officially 
Launches Peru LNG Project - Chicago Bridge & Iron is Awarded EPC Contract 
for Gas Liquefaction Plant, Press release Peru LNG, Lima, 22 January 2007; 
CB&I Awarded LNG Liquefaction Project in Peru, Press release CB&I, The 
Woodlands, 23 January 2007; Peru LNG moves forward, Project Finance, 
London, 30 January 2007
98  LNG export project's plant in main construction phase - Peru, 
David Casallas, Business News Americas, 4 October 2007
are raised from two multilateral development 
banks: The Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) approved a loan of US$ 400 million in 
December 2007. 99 And in February 2008 the 
International Finance Corporation, a subsidiary 
of the World Bank, approved a US$ 300 million 
loan for Peru LNG amid intense national and 
international criticism.100 
ECA involvement
The original Camisea project involves two 
consortia of energy companies, upstream 
(gas production) and downstream (gas 
transportation). Members of the upstream 
consortium are Pluspetrol, Hunt Oil,  
SK Corporation, Tecpetrol, Sonatrach and 
Repsol. Downstream members are Techint, 
Pluspetrol, Hunt Oil, SK Corporation, Grana y 
Montero, Sonatrach and distribution partner 
Tractebel.
99   IDB approves US$400 million loan for Peru LNG project, Press 
Release Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, 19 December 
2007
100  IFC Board Approves Gas Investment to Support Economic Growth 
in Peru Project is Largest Foreign Direct Investment in the Country’s History, 
Press release IFC, Washington, 5 February 2008; Peru’s gas exporting project 
gets World Bank loan, Reuters, New York, 5 February 2008 
Along this access road the entire slope had 
completely fallen away into the stream. No 
wonder the water is dirty and people report 
no fish!
Photo: Peter Kostishack
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Early on in the project Chase Manhattan 
Bank contributed a US$25 million loan to 
Pluspetrol, guaranteed by the US Ex-Im 
Bank.101 However, in August 2003 following 
pressure from environmental and indigenous 
rights organizations, as well as members of the 
US Congress, the Camisea Project was denied 
financing of US$213 million by Ex-Im. Just 
weeks later, the board of the Inter-American 
Development Bank, a multilateral organization 
with 27 member countries from the North and 
South America as well as the Caribbean, voted 
to fund the project, with the US representative 
abstaining.
In September 2002, the Brazilian export credit 
agency BNDES-Exim agreed to a loan of 
US$109.7 million to the transport consortium 
to buy steel tubes from the Brazilian 
company	Cofab,	a	subsidiary	of	Techint	(Italy/
Argentina).102 Later the loan was decreased 
to US$102.8 million.103 In October 2005 the 
transport consortium decided not to take up 
the loan, and instead issue additional bonds 
with a value of US$80 million. It is not clear 
why this decision was taken.
A concession to distribute gas to industries 
and electricity plants in the Lima region was 
awarded to the Cálidda, which is owned by 
the Belgian company Suez Energy (formerly 
Tractebel). Suez Energy is part of the French 
Suez Group.104 The total investment costs 
for the distribution part of the project 
were valued at US$71 million.105 The total 
101  Activists urge banks to steer clear of Camisea gas project, 
Inter Press Service, Washington, 14 May 2002; N. Martinez/J. Vallette, 
Destabilizing Investment in the Americas: Public Funding for Fossil 
Fuels After Rio, Sustainable Energy and Economy Network, Washington, 
September 2002
102  Confab aumenta em 177,1% sua meta de exportação com apoio 
do BNDES-exim, Press Release BNDES,  2 September 2002; BNDES could 
provide US$100mn TGP pipeline loan - Peru, Business News Americas, 29 
October 2002; BNDES approves US$109mn export financing loan for TGP - 
Peru, Business News Americas, 28 November 2002
103  Camisea Pipeline - Deal Of The Year Nomination Region: Latin 
America (Peru) Sector: Oil & Gas, Inter-American Development Bank, 
Washington, December 2004
104  Website Cálidda (www.calidda.com.pe)
105  Camisea Pipeline - Deal Of The Year Nomination Region
investment was insured by the Belgian ECA 
Nationale Delcrederedienst.106
More recently (in 2005), Nationale 
Delcrederedienst has agreed to an export 
credit guarantee for dredging services to 
be provided by Jan de Nul (Belgium) to the 
planned liquefaction plant on the Peruvian 
coast. Total investment costs for this project 
are estimated at US$3.3 billion, of which 60% 
is being sourced from loans for which ECAs are 
being approached to guarantee.107
In January 2008 US-Exim, after having refused 
cover in 2003, approved a US$459 million 
export credit for Camisea II.108 It appears that 
Italian ECA SACE also approved a guarantee 
for Camisea II in December 2007 but neither 
the approval nor the amount could be 
confirmed at this point.109 According to 
Marubeni, one of the owners of the project, 
the Export-Import Bank of Korea is also 
expected to participate in the financing of the 
project.110
The UK’s ECGD was considering a guarantee 
but after pressure from civil society, ECGD 
confirmed in November 2007 that the 
company had withdrawn its application.111
Access to forests and illegal logging
As detailed in an earlier FERN paper,112 the 
opening of previously isolated forest brought 
workers, colonists and loggers to the area; 
106  Tractebel Wins 30 Years Gas Distribution Concession In Lima, Peru, 
Press Release Tractebel, Brussels, 3 May 2002
107  Website Nationale Delcrederedienst (www.ondd.be), Viewed in 
January 2006; Website Proyecto Gato (www.proyectogato.be), Viewed in 
January 2006
108  US Ex-Im Bank, Board Minutes, 24 January 2008. Available 
at:  http://www.exim.gov/article.cfm/0E64F560-05E1-1AB7-
58FDB218D6ABF577/ 
109  Confidential information from internal source at SACE, December 
2007
110  Marubeni Corporation to Participate in Peru LNG Project, Press 
release Marubeni Corporation, Tokyo, 29 August 2007; Website Korea 
Eximbank (http://www.koreaexim.go.kr/en/fservice/m01/s04_03.jsp), 
Viewed in March 2008.
111  Email of 26 November 2007 from ECGD to Tom Griffiths, Forest 
Peoples Programme
112  C. Marijnissen, Export Credits. Fuelling Illegal Logging
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many of whom settled on indigenous lands. 
Reports of violence and illegal logging in 
indigenous territories increased dramatically 
from 2001, when construction of the project 
began. Local accounts reveal that Techint 
began work on the pipeline route and access 
roads illegally and without prior authorization 
or permission from landowners. Despite 
requests from local groups, the pipeline 
consortium has reportedly failed to provide 
enforcement capacity to protect the pipeline 
route from loggers and have left responsibility 
for controlling colonization in the hands of 
local communities, potentially placing them 
at the centre of future conflict over their legal 
right to land and forest resources. More than 
80% of Camisea II or ‘Block 56’ is superimposed 
on the lands of seven titled Native 
Communities. At this point, questions remain 
over the legality of the original demarcation of 
Block 56 and the sale of concession rights that 
did not ensure meaningful prior consultation 
and consent of affected communities as 
required by international and national law.113 
AIDESEP, the official representative of 
indigenous communities in the Peruvian 
Amazon; and COMARU, the Machiguenga 
tribal council, believe that pipeline developers 
have long disregarded the legal rights of 
local people and have endangered traditional 
communities and the ecosystems they depend 
upon. Specifically COMARU says pipeline 
expansion violates Machiguenga rights, the 
Peruvian Constitution and International Law.114
In 2003, Friends of the Earth US reported that 
U.S. Ex-Im’s Evironmental Impact Assessment, 
obtained through a Freedom of Information 
Act request, provided additional evidence 
of illegal logging and significant social and 
environmental damage. The assessment found 
impact mitigation measures for Camisea to 
be ‘woefully inadequate’ and asserted that 
they would result in ‘irreversible impacts’ to 
the forest and the spread of non-indigenous 
113  T. Griffiths: Holding the IDB and IFC to account on Camisea II, p 17 
and 37
114  Declaration by Indigenous Peoples in Defence of Life, Territory 
and the Environment, August 2003. Available at http://www.bicusa.org/
Legacy/AIDESEP_camisea_statement_25.08.03.pdf 
diseases. In 2005, after fifteen months of 
operations, the pipeline suffered its fourth 
significant spill as a result of failing to abide 
by environmental requirements and reports 
of illegal local damage made to date are too 
numerous to list.115
Although some ECAs appear to have pulled 
out of the project under pressure from civil 
society, nothing suggests that their stated 
environmental safeguard policies identified 
the weaknesses in the proposed project 
independently, and the support for the project 
by ECAs from Belgium, the US and, apparently, 
Italy suggest that the existing minimum 
international standards are not an effective 
screen for projects of this sort.
115  Friends of the Earth US, Press Release, August 2003. Available at 
http://www.foe.org/new/releases/0803camisea.html 
An indigenous community in the Urubamba 
region.
Photo: Aaron Goldzimer/Environmental Defense
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Glossary
Category A project
The OECD Recommendation on Export Credits and the Environment classifies a project as 
‘Category A’ if it has the potential to have significant adverse environmental impacts. These 
impacts may affect an area broader than the sites or facilities subject to physical works. 
Category A, in principle, includes projects in sensitive sectors or located in or near sensitive 
areas. 
Common Approaches
Short for ‘OECD Recommendation on Common Approaches for Officially Supported Export 
Credits and the Environment’. The Common Approaches aim to level the international playing 
field by identifying and evaluating the environmental and social impacts of ECA-backed 
projects.
Contract and revenue transparency
To ensure more responsible and equitable management of extractive industries, many 
International Finance Institutions have started to endorse the principle of (conditional) 
contract and revenue transparency as set out in the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI). 
Due diligence
A term used for a number of concepts involving either the performance of an investigation 
of a business or person, or the performance of an act with a certain standard of care. It can 
be a legal obligation, but the term will more commonly apply to voluntary investigations. 
In business transactions, the due diligence process varies for different types of companies. 
The relevant areas of concern may include the financial, legal, labour, tax, environment and 
commercial situation of the company. 
Emerging market economies
An emerging, or developing, market economy (EME) is defined as an economy with low-to-
middle per capita income. Such countries constitute approximately 80 per cent of the global 
population, representing about 20 per cent of the world's economies. Although a loose 
definition, countries whose economies fall into this category, varying from very big to very 
small, are usually considered emerging because of their developments and reforms. EMEs are 
considered to be fast growing economies.
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Greenfield investment/project
A Greenfield Investment is the investment in a manufacturing, office, or other physical 
structure in an area where no previous facilities exist. The name comes from the idea of 
building a facility literally on a "green" field, such as farmland or a forest. 
Hardwood kraft pulp
The ‘Kraft process’ describes a technology for conversion of wood into wood pulp consisting 
of almost pure cellulose fibres. The process entails treatment of wood chips with sodium 
hydroxide and sodium sulfide. The name is derived from German ‘kraft’, meaning strength/
power but is most commonly used in the pulp and paper industry.
Reverse takeover
A ‘reverse takeover’ occurs when a publicly-traded smaller company acquires ownership 
of a larger company. It typically requires reorganization of capitalization of the acquiring 
company.
Single pulp line
Large, single-line fiberlines have become the standard for today's new market pulp mills. 
Many mills started up in North America and Europe in the 1970s and 1980s utilised at least 
two lines, either to produce both hardwood and softwood pulp or to generate the desired 
capacity because a single line couldn't produce the necessary tonnage.
Sovereign debt agreement/sovereign counter guarantee
In a sovereign debt agreement or sovereign counter guarantee the host country’s  
government pledges payment in case of default. Hence, when the ECA-backed exporting 
company doesn’t get paid for exported goods or services, it is reimbursed with public money 
that its government will try to recover from the host country through such an agreement.
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)
SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
1969 to supplement existing official reserves of member countries. Today, the SDR has only 
limited use as a reserve asset, and its main function is to serve as the unit of account of the 
IMF and some other international organizations.  
Turnkey contract
‘Turnkey’ refers to something that is ready for immediate use, generally used in the sale or 
supply of goods or services. The term is common in the construction industry, for instance, in 
which it refers to the bundling of materials and labour by sub-contractors. A turnkey project 
is a project in which separate entities are responsible for setting up a plant or equipment and 
for putting it into operation. 
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